סמינר בשיווק

Simone Moran

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Abstract

Deception is pervasive in negotiations. In this talk I will present two independent research projects exploring and demonstrating whether and how negotiators’ tendency to engage in deceptive tactics is moderated by positive pre-negotiation (a) interactions with or (b) reputation information about negotiation counterparts. In the first, we focus on pre-negotiation interactions. We specifically examine effects of varying pre-negotiation gratitude evoking gestures (monetary versus non-monetary) and find that people are reluctant to negotiate with their non-monetary benefactors, and that when negotiating with them they are more driven by prosocial motivations & avoiding anticipated guilt, and consequently tend to use less competitive and deceptive tactics. In the second, we focus on effects of reputation, primarily differentiating between friendly and honest reputations, which are both seemingly cooperative and often tangled in the negotiation literature. Employing varied methods, we reveal that negotiators are less likely to deceive counterparts with honest compared to friendly reputations. This effect is mediated by greater anticipated feelings of guilt and shame when deceiving presumably honest counterparts and is moderated by negotiators’ a-priori deception tendencies. Importantly, we also find that honest reputations can backfire. When counterparts’ honest reputations are incongruent with their inherent deception tendencies, they elicit increased deception and attain less efficient negotiation outcomes. These findings point to the advantage of having a candid honest negotiator reputation along with the risk of having a false one.