סמינר בשיווק

Stav Rosenzweig from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Policies designed to curb pollution by incentivizing the purchase of energy-efficient cars have been implemented in numerous countries. However, similar policy measures designed to curb consumption of electricity, water, or unhealthy food, were found to rebound, or even backfire. The literature largely ascribes such undesirable effects to a licensing mechanism. We extend this literature, combine it with the literature on the effect of cues on consumer behavior, and posit that the presence of an environmental cue elicits a licensing effect that generates increased usage. We examine a national environmental policy implemented in Israel in 2009, which intended to reduce pollution by incentivizing the purchasing of new energy-efficient cars. Using this policy as a natural experiment setting, we test changes in kilometers traveled following the implementation of the policy. We suggest that the mere presence of an environmental cue – a pollution scale – in the context of purchasing a new car, triggers a licensing effect and consequently increases car usage.