סמינר באסטרטגיה וכלכלת עסקים

Too Talented to Innovate?  Dynamic Entrepreneurial Reputation, Project Selection and Welfare

Joint with Noam Shamir         

25 בינואר 2017, 11:15 
חדר 408 

This paper integrates entrepreneurial reputation into a multi-period model which explores the financing and execution of heterogeneous projects under asymmetric information. Reputation can be acquired following successful execution but may also be inferred from project selection. Under certain conditions, talented entrepreneurs may signal their ability by choosing to forgo the execution of profitable projects. Forgoing execution may also improve welfare. Our results highlight the role of low-NPV projects, which require less financing capital, in generating reputation and facilitating strategic separation. We show that a small change in the availability of such low-NPV projects may generate a significant increase in welfare.

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